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Taylor vs. State, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 27 (April. 21, 2016)1
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Summary
The Court determined that (1) access and usage of historical cell phone connection data
without a warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment if the “specific and articulable facts”
standard is met, 2 (2) the out-of-court and in-court identifications did not violate Taylor’s
constitutional rights to due process of law, (3) the prosecutorial conduct during closing
arguments did not violate Taylor’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial or Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, and (4) there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury's
finding of guilt.
Background
Donald Taylor appealed from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of (1)
burglary while in possession of a firearm, (2) conspiracy to commit robbery, (3) robbery with the
use of a deadly weapon, and (4) murder with the use of a deadly weapon. More specifically, on
appeal, Taylor alleged that the access and usage of his historical cell phone connection data
without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. Taylor further alleged that the key witness,
Angela Chenault’s, positive identification of him during the show-up procedure and in-court
procedures violated his constitutional right to due process of law. Finally, Taylor alleged that the
prosecutorial conduct during closing arguments violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial
and his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
The robbery-murder
On November 18, 2010 Angela Chenault witnessed the Defendant rob her daughter’s
significant other of a bag of marijuana in her own house, and his subsequent murder by two men,
allegedly his friends.
Incidents leading to Taylor’s arrest
Law enforcement officials tracked the victim’s phone records, which lead them to the
arrest of Defendant Donald Taylor.
The out-of-court identification procedure
At 11:45 PM, Detective Wildemann brought Chenault to the parking lot, where Taylor
was being held to conduct a one-on-one. Detective Wildemann had to superimpose lighting on
Taylor by pulling vehicles around, and drove Chenault around twice for her to better see Taylor.
After Detective Wildemann showed Chenault Taylor’s photograph, she gave a positive
identification.
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Taylor’s indictment and conviction
On January 14, 2011, after a six-day jury trial, Taylor was indicted on all four charges
listed above. The district court denied Taylor’s motion for a new trial and filed the judgment of
conviction on March 7, 2014. This appeal followed.
Discussion
The warrantless access and use of Taylor’s historical cell phone location data did not violate
Taylor’s Fourth Amendment rights
Taylor argued his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the State did not have
a warrant.
A search warrant is not required to obtain historical cell site location information
Law enforcement can acquire two (2) types of cell site location information (CSLI) from
cell phone companies – historical CSLI (records containing CSLI, kept by cell phone companies)
and prospective CSLI (incoming CSLI as received from a user’s cellphone in “real” time). 3
Traditionally, a warrant is required for obtaining prospective CSLI. The Court applied the
“specific and articulable facts” standard and considered judicial decisions within other circuits to
determine whether obtaining historical CSLI also requires a warrant. The Court recognized that
circuit courts are not consistent when ruling on this particular issue.
A warrant is not required under the Fourth Amendment to obtain historical CSLI
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, should the location
information sought by law enforcement infringe a person’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights, a
judge has discretion in requiring a warrant for historical CSLI.4 There, the Court concluded that
many cell phone users do not relinquish such information voluntarily because they are not aware
that cell phone providers collect and store historical CSLI. 5 However, the Court additionally
found that obtaining a warrant for historical CSLI does not require a showing of the “traditional
probable cause determination.”6
In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, generally,
cell phone users do not have an expectation of privacy regarding historical CSLI for four (4)
reasons: Cell phone users have knowledge that: 1. to wirelessly connect the call, the cellphone
must send a signal to a near by cell tower; 2. that signal is sent when the cell phone user makes
or receives a call; 3. the signal is then sent to the service provider; and 4. the cellphone user,

3

Kyle Malone, The Fourth Amendment and the Stored Communications Act: Why the Warrantless Gathering of
Historical Cell Site Location Information Poses No Threat to Privacy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 710 (2013).
4
In re Application of U. S. for an Order Directing Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t,
620 F.3d 304, 319 (3rd Cir. 2010).
5
Id. at 317-18.
6
Id. at 313.
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being aware of this procedure, is conveying the information voluntarily to the cell phone
provider.7 There, the Court upheld the “specific and articulable facts” standard.8
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a cell phone user “ha[s] no
reasonable expectation of privacy in business records made, kept, and owned by [his or her cell
phone provider].” 9 There, the Court reasoned that historical CSLI only reveals the precise
location of the cell phone towers but not the location of the cell phone or the cell phone user.10
Finally, the Court emphasized the importance of a showing of a compelling government interest
when ruling on whether historical CSLI violates the Fourth Amendment.
Here, the Court followed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and upheld not only the
“specific and articulable facts” standard but also the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that a
“defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in business records made, kept, and owned
by his or her cell phone provider.”
Taylor’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
The Court held that law enforcement’s warrantless access to Taylor’s historical CSLI did
not violate his Fourth Amendment right to privacy for two reasons. First, the § 2703(d) order was
necessary to obtain Taylor’s historical CSLI to determine necessary facts regarding the murder;
and second, Taylor did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding business records
made, kept, and owned by his cell phone provider.
The out-of-court and in-court identifications did not violate Taylor’s constitutional right to due
process of law
A pretrial identification is constitutionally sound if, considering the totality of
circumstances, the identification procedure was “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification that [appellant] was denied due process of law.” 11 A
suggestive and unnecessary procedure is shown by “lack of emergency or exigent
circumstances.”12 However, even if the procedure was suggestive and unnecessary, should the
identification be sufficiently reliable, the jury has the burden of weighing the evidence and
assessing the witnesses.13
Exigent circumstances justified the show-up identification procedure
Exigent circumstances, which justify a show-up identification procedure include:
ensuring fresher memory, exonerating innocent people by making prompt identifications, and
ensuring that those committing serious dangerous felonies are swiftly apprehended. 14 Those
7

In re Application, 724 F.3d at 612–13 (5th Cir. 2013).
Id.
9
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 517 (11th Cir. 2015).
10
Id. at 504.
11
Banks v. State, 94 Nev. 90, 94, 575 P.2d 592, 595 (1978).
12
Id.
13
Gehrke v. State, 96 Nev. 581, 584, 613 P.2d 1028, 1029 (1980).
14
Banks, 94 Nev. at 94, 575 P.2d at 595.
8
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factors could outweigh the danger of a show-up procedure being suggestive in itself due to “law
enforcement officials believ[ing] they have caught the offender.”15
Therefore, the Court concluded that the exigent circumstances here - murder during the
course of an armed robbery, possession of marijuana and a high possibility of the suspects to
commit further felonies, justified the show-up identification procedure.
The show-up identification was unreliable
The Court found the show-up identification procedure was unreliable. The Court applied
the following factors: Opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the crime;
degree of attention paid by the witness; accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the suspect;
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of show-up; and length of time
between the crime and the show-up.16
The in-court identification by Chenault was independently reliable
The Court concluded the in-court identification by the witness was independently reliable
because the Supreme Court has allowed an in-court subsequent identification following an
unnecessarily suggestive pre-trial procedure producing an unreliable identification. The Court
here applied the same factors as for show-up identification procedures.
The error was harmless
The Court held the error was harmless because, even though the district court erroneously
allowed the out-of-court identification into evidence, the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
In conclusion, for the reasons listed above, the Court held that the out-of-court and incourt identifications did not violate Taylor’s constitutional rights to due process of law.
The prosecutorial conduct during closing arguments did not violate Taylor’s Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial or Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
The PowerPoint slide with “GUILTY” superimposed on it did not violate Taylor’s right
to a fair trial
A PowerPoint slide may only be used to make arguments, which would be proper if made
orally. 17 However, this Court has previously held that a photograph with the word “Guilty”
shown during closing arguments is insufficient for a finding of error.

15
16
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Jones v. State, 95 Nev. 613, 617, 600 P.2d 247, 250 (1979).
Gehrke, 96 Nev. at 584, P.2d at 1030.
Watters v. State, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. 94, 313 P.3d 243, 247 (2013).
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Here, the Court concluded that the PowerPoint slide did not violate Taylor’s right to a fair
trial because the slide was displayed briefly at the end of the prosecutor’s closing arguments and
defendant did not object to the slide.
The comments made during closing arguments did not violate Taylor’s Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial or Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination
The prosecutor’s comments during closing arguments were permissible
Here, the Court found the prosecutor’s statements “reasonable conclusions based on the
evidence.”
The prosecutor did not comment on Taylor’s decision not to testify
Should the prosecution directly comment on the defendant's decision not to testify, the
prosecution would be in violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.18
Here, the Court held that the prosecutor’s comment only indirectly referenced Taylor’s failure to
testify, and did not intend for the comment to have an impression on the jury.
There was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury's finding of guilt
The Court reviewed the evidence before the jury and held that a jury’s verdict is valid if,
acting reasonably, the jury could be convinced of the defendant’s guilt by evidence it had the
right to consider, including circumstantial evidence. 19 Considering the statements from the
witnesses and the cell phone company records, the Court held there was sufficient evidence at
trial to support the jury's finding of guilt.
Conclusion
The Court established that a warrant is required for obtaining prospective CSLI but, as
long as all conditions for a § 2703(d) order are met (the “specific and articulable facts” standard),
a warrant is not required for historical CSLI. The Court further found that the erroneous
admission of the out-of-court identification constituted a harmless error beyond a reasonable
doubt, the in-court identification was sufficiently independent. Furthermore, the Court held that
the prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments and the prosecutor’s indirect comments
regarding Taylor’s decision not to testify were insufficient for a finding of error. Finally, the
Court found there was sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury’s finding of guilt. Therefore,
the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.
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Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
Edwards v. State, 90 Nev. 255, 258–59, 524 P.2d 328, 331 (1974).
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